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Nordquist and Iguchi: Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective from Japan

Murray, Williamson, and Jim Lacey, eds. The
Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath
of War. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009.
408pp. $93

There are countless books written on
war but fewer on the problems of postwar or even intrawar peacemaking. This
work thus offers top-quality case studies on a subject of enormous relevance.
It will be of value to policy makers, academics, and general readers alike.
The Making of Peace is a collection of
essays written by eminent historians
known mainly for their writings on war.
Sir Michael Howard’s preface sets the
bar high, observing that the usual
war/peace dichotomy is artificial, since
the historical default is perpetual conflicts “that need not necessarily be resolved by force, and it is the business of
statesmen to ensure that they are not.”
The book’s central argument is that effective peacemaking requires in-depth
knowledge of the past; a healthy awareness of the political, historical, and cultural context within which a war has
taken place; and a full appreciation of
the characteristics of the “other.” As
Murray writes in the introduction,
“Without guideposts from the past to
suggest paths to the future, then any
road, no matter how irrelevant and inappropriate, will do. And such roads
will inevitably lead to future conflicts.”
However, that is not to imply that there
are easy solutions. At the core of this
book are eleven rich case studies of
postwar peacemaking in the Western
world, including chapters by, of course,
Williamson Murray, as well as Paul
Rahe, Derek Croxton and Geoffrey
Parker, Fred Anderson, Richard Hart
Sinnreich, James McPherson, Marcus

Jones, John Gooch, Colin Gray, Jim
Lacey, and Fred Kagan. Sinnreich offers
a thoughtful conclusion, “History and
the Making of Peace,” which ties together the major themes and offers
three interesting “theories” of peace, all
the while echoing B. H. Liddell Hart’s
dictum that the best way to formulate
effective grand strategy is to look beyond a war to the nature of the peace.
Curiously, the editors stress the importance of knowing your adversary in
peacemaking, but the volume suffers
from scant attention to non-Western
case studies. Although they anticipate
this criticism, their ethnocentrism detracts from an otherwise sterling collection of cases, especially when the
United States and its Western allies actively chase peace with non-Western
adversaries. A more minor flaw is the
absence of a bibliography of key sources
on peacemaking, or even just those
used in this book. Nonetheless, this is
an impressive collection for students of
strategy and history, as all serious policy makers, practitioners, and informed
citizens ought to be.
AUDREY KURTH CRONIN

National War College

Iguchi, Takeo. Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New
Perspective from Japan. Translated by David Noble. Tokyo: I-House, 2010. 343pp. $60

This carefully researched book painstakingly corrects the diplomatic history
surrounding Japan’s attack on Pearl
Harbor. The author is a retired Japanese ambassador who was the young
son of the Japanese counselor in Washington, D.C., on 7 December 1941. Unlike too many Japanese writers, Iguchi
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is no apologist for the sneak attack.
Rather he objectively analyzes recently
released empirical evidence that reveals
the individuals truly responsible for delaying lawful notice to the United States
about the coming attack. The fault did
not rest with the embassy staff, as portrayed to the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, but with a conspiracy to cover up
facts, a conspiracy that is now traceable
to high-level officials who deliberately
delayed Foreign Ministry telegrams.
Moreover, the Japanese notes delivered
to then–secretary of state Cordell Hull
shortly after the attack were not
declaration-of-war ultimatums as required by international law but watereddown notices about the termination of
bilateral negotiations. The unmistakable conclusion from the evidence is
that the officials in power wanted to
catch the Americans off guard.
Iguchi writes from firsthand experience
and with convincing passion about
those in Japan who even now do not
want to accept responsibility for their
country’s perfidious actions. He cites
authoritatively from official, insider records, not only placing blame where it
belongs but also clearing up the record
to allow closure, moving to more open
and honest U.S.-Japanese relations.
The book provides a detailed time-line
context for the foreign policy pursued
by Japan throughout 1940–41, when the
focus of the Japanese military was on
China and the Soviet Union. Iguchi rejects the thesis that American economic
sanctions and demands for a complete
withdrawal of Japanese forces from
China forced Japan into war. Iguchi
identifies powerful Japanese strategic
thinkers who believed that the only way
resource-poor Japan could win a war
against the United States and Great

BOOK REVIEWS

153

Britain was by a quick and devastating
surprise attack. Iguchi also documents
contrary views held by influential Japanese leaders at the time who tried to
halt the momentum for war.
Iguchi does not believe there was an
American conspiracy to provoke war
with Japan. He also rejects such myths
as that Roosevelt knew in advance of
the Pearl Harbor attack or that Churchill was responsible, meaning to draw
the United States into war against
Hitler.
The value of this book is in how candidly and accurately Iguchi documents
the historical context for the Pacific
War. He explains Japanese motives
based on his unique personal experiences, reinforced by formerly classified
internal Japanese records. There is no
forgiving Japan’s cowardly attack on
Pearl Harbor, but there is much to admire about a senior Japanese diplomat
who courageously does his best to set
the record straight.
MYRON H. NORDQUIST

University of Virginia School of Law
Charlottesville, Virginia

Thomas, Evan. The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge,
Hearst, and the Rush to Empire, 1898. New York:
Little, Brown, 2010. 413pp. $29.99

American journalist and historian Evan
Thomas has once again proved why he
is among the foremost modern scholars
of American history, culture, and politics. The War Lovers is a captivating
chronicle of war fever and calculated
crisis manipulated by key leaders in the
run-up to the twentieth century and
culminating in the Spanish-American
War. Thomas assembles a compelling
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